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THISstudy estimates, by analysis of an aggregate model of the Ca-
nadian economy, some possible effects on capital flows and the balance
of payments of two alternative tax-reform packages. The general ap-
proach follows conventional lines, although application on the scale
attempted in this paper is somewhat unusual, and the two tax-reform
packages actually evaluated are both novel and interesting in them-
selves. The first represents the proposals set out in the Report of the
• Royal Commission on Taxation (The Carter Commission) in 1967,'
and the second is based on the proposals for tax reform contained in
a White Paper issued by the Canadian government in October 1969.2
We employ a consistent macroeconomic model of Canada em-
• bodying conditions of flow equilibrium customary in analysis of mon-
etary and fiscal policy in an open economy. Within the framework of
the model, we represent proposed tax reforms as changes in tax param-
eters or shifts in behavioral relationships. Given such a representa-
tion, we may then ask how such changes alter the equilibrium of the
• system and how, on balance, trade and flows of capital are affected.3
Thus we may think of the model as described by the system
H(x,z)=O
F(x,z;r)0,
NOTE:Researchsupport from an tzaak Walton Killam Award by the Canada Council
is gratefully acknowledged.
'Reportof the Royal Commission on Taxation (sixvolumes). Ottawa, Queen's
Printer, 1967 (hereafter, Carter Report).
Honorable E. J. Benson, Proposalsfor TaX Reform. Ottawa,Queen's Printer, 1969.
F.Helliwell, 'Simulating the Macroeconomic Effect of the Carter Proposals."
CanadianJournal of Economics, Supp.I(February, 1968), pp.233—254, describesa 1_riorattemptto carry out a similar assessment.
1 9-r
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whereH is a vector-valued function of the flows z and the equilibrating
vanables x, representing the equilibrium conditions of the model, and
F is a vector-valued function of the same variables (depending on the
vector r of tax parameters), representing the behavioral relations de-
scribing the determination of the endogenous flows.4
We consider a change in the tax system to be represented formally
by movement to a new vector T,andare therefore concerned with the
differential system
—[o
We wish to estimate the constant column, or vector of initial shocks
(shifts in the behavioral relations), F1dr, resulting from a proposed
change in tax structure, and then to determine the subsequent changes,
• dx in equilibrating variables and dz in flows, necessary to restore equi-
librium. We shall call the solution to the subset of equations arising
from the condition dF =0,subject to the restriction dx =0,the im-
pact effect of the tax change. This solution represents the changes
necessary to ensure that all behavioral and accounting relationships
are respected, but before any market adjustment through price or yield
changes (or compensating government policies) occurs. The final effect
is the unrestricted solution to the complete differential system. A com-
pensated policychange involves imposition of some constraints
dz1=0.
inorder to determine these solutions, we require numerical es-
timates for the shocks, and the partial derivatives,and
of the behavioral relationships. (The coefficients andare non-
stochastic values given directly by the form of the flow-equilibrium
conditions employed.)
Sincethe model incorporates sectoral sources and uses-of-funds constraints, these
behavioral relations either must be determined so that all flows are automatically con-
sistent with such constraints, in which case behavioral relations for each endogenous
flow appear explicitly while the constraints are omitted, or else behavioral relations for
some flows must be omitted, leaving these flows to be determined residually by the re-
quirements of accounting balance in each sector, then appearing explicitly in the
model. We have followed the latter procedure.IMPACT OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL FLOWS: CANADA • 521
EQUILIBRIUMCONDITIONS
WE DEAL inthismodel with markets for five paper assets—domestic
bonds, equity of domestic extractive industries, equity of domestic
nonextractive industries, foreign securities, and money—along with
markets for foreign exchange and for goods. The core of our model is
a set of equilibrium conditions for these markets. Specifically, we im-
pose a condition of equilibrium in the balance of payments, on the bond
market, the two equity markets, the goods market, and the money
market.
In addition, we recognize five accounting identities. These are
statements of the sources and uses of corporate funds, statements de-
scribing the disposition of corporate incomes for the two sectors (ex-
tractive and nonextractive industries), and an identity describing the
uses of personal saving.
These two sets of conditions yield eleven relationships. As always,
one is redundant in this general-equilibrium system, and we drop the
balance-of-payments equation. Moreover, we assume that monetary
policy accommodates itself to money-market demands so as to main-
tain equilibrium in asset markets and in the balance of payments.
Monetary policy, therefore, is determined endogenously in this model,
and we may omit explicit representation of the money market.5
Thus we arrive at a system of nine equations, the first four being
the clearing conditions for asset markets and goods markets, and the
others being, essentially, sources-and-uses.of-funds statements for cor-
porations and households, together with two conditions embodying our
assumption that underlying real-capital structures (and therefore net
before-tax operating incomes of producers) are unaltered. Let us now
specify these equations more precisely.
The model is focused particularly on the balance of payments and
flows of capital. Therefore, among its most important components are
the items that enter the balance-of-payments statement itself.
For present purposes we shall consider only the summary var-
iables shown in Table 1. The first equilibrium condition can then be
5The inclusion of the money market equation would merely serve to indicate the
change in the money supply required to sustain the equilibrium solution..4
.
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• TABLE I
• Glossary and Notation
(in order of appearance in the rows of thecoefficient matrix; all variables
are to be interpretedasdifferentials)
BE Bond issues by the extractive industry, both resident and nonresident
BN Bond issues by thenonextractiveindustry, both resident and non-
resident
NE New issues of equity, extractive industry
NN New issues of equity, nonextractive industry
RE Corporate retentions, extractive industry
RN Corporate retentions, nonextractive industry
DPAE Dividends paid abroad, extractive industry
DP14NDividends paid abroad, nonextractive industry
FDE Foreigners' direct investment in Canada, extractive industry
FDN Foreigners' direct investment in Canada, nonextractive industry
CDE Direct investment abroad by the Canadian extractive industry
CDN Direct investment abroad by the Canadian nonextractive industry
CCAE Capital consumption allowances, extractive industry
CCAN Capital consumption allowances, nonextractive industry
IPAInterest paid abroad
IFAInterest from abroad
DFAE Dividends received from abroad, extractive industry
DFAN Dividends received from abroad, nonextractive industry
CSE Canadian demand for securities, extractive industry
CSN Canadian demand for securities, nonextractive industry
FSE Foreign demand for securities, extractive industry
FSN Foreign demand for securities, nonextractive industry
FBForeign demand for Canadian bonds in Canadian markets
CS Canadian demand for foreign securities
TE Taxes levied on nonresident firms, extractive industry
TER Taxes levied on resident firms, extractive industry (in all computa-
tions, present data limitations force aggregation of TE with TER)
TN Taxes levied on nonresident firms, nonextractive industry
TNR Taxes levied on resident firms, nonextractive industry (in all com-
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TABLEI(concluded)
Price of equity in the extractive industry relative to price of bonds
q,,Price of equity in the nonextractive industry relative to price of bonds
RRate of interest
CB Canadian demand for bonds
DDEDividendspaid to domestic shareholders, extractive industry
DDNDividendspaid to domestic shareholders, nonextractive industry
Change in official holdings of gold and foreign exchange
derived as follows. From the balance-of-payments statement we have
one relationship that determines the rate of change in official holdings
of gold and foreign-exchange reserves, namely,
X+DFAE+DFAN+IFA —DPAE—DPAN—IPA +FDE
(0)
We shall interpret equilibrium in the balance of payments as requiring,
simply, thatthechange in official holdings, be zero.
Turning to the bond market, there are two categories of supplier:
the government issuing debt to finance whatever portion of its deficit
is not matched by an increase in the money supply, and resident or
nonresident corporations in the extractive or nonextractive industries,
issuing debt to meet part of their capital requirements. From the con-
dition that the flow demand, resident and nonresident, be balanced by
the debt issue of those suppliers, we obtain an equation
FB+CB—BE—BER—BN—BNR
—[G—TE—TER—TN—TNR—TO—+=0.(1)
For present purposes, in order to obtain estimates of the different
degrees of pressure on the prices for equities of firms in the extractive
and nonextractive industries, we suppose that the markets for these
securities are sufficiently segmented so that their yields need not nec-
Ourmodel assumes that full sterilization of inflows occurs directly through the money
supply; although alternative procedures are conceivable, we do not wish to consider the
consequences of less-than-full sterilization, or of full sterilization accomplished by other
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essarily be forced into balance. Then we obtain two market-clearing
conditions,
FSE + CSE —NE—NER=0 (2)
and
FSN+CSN—NN—NNR_—0, (3)
for the markets for the shares of corporations in each of thesetwo
sectors.
The fundamental national-income identity, or generalized saving-




This equation has a natural interpretation in terms of the contri-
butions of firms in extractive and nonextractive industries, thegovern-
ment, and households, to sources and uses of saving.
A similar condition of accounting balance must hold in the financ-
ing of investment by each firm or class of firms. If for each of the four
classes of firm (extractive, nonextractjve; resident, nonresident)a con-
dition of this type Is imposed, one obtains four equationsto be added
to the model. In fact, however, we have found it necessary to aggregate
the resident and foreign-owned firms in each of the two industry classes.
Thus we obtain the following two equations:
BE + NE + RE + CCAE + FDE CDE—IE=0, (5)
and
BN+NN+RN+CCAN+FDN—CDN—IN0 (6)
Since, as noted earlier, we are examininga flow equilibrium, we as-
sume that no changes in cash balances or in the net position on short-
term assets or liabilities may occur.
Since the rate of addition to domestically held financialassets is
necessarily equal to personal saving, one has also
PS—CSE—CSN—CF—CB—10 (7)
*[1
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Wetake—as a first approximation—the assumption that gross
operating incomes and operating expenses remain roughly unchanged
following the hypothetical implementation of the proposed reforms. In
a neoclassical world, this amounts to assuming the period of analysis
to be sufficiently short so that one can ignore the effects of changes in
capital stocks upon marginal rates of return to capital. However, in a
more eclectic (and more realistic) world, one also needs to assume that
no short-run shifting of the changes in the corporate-income tax oc-
curs. While the precise extent, if any, of such shifting in the United
States remains an unresolved empirical issue, in a more open economy
possible forward shifting of domestic corporate-income taxes is much
more limited, because of the actual or potential competition from for-
eign goods as the Carter Commission indicates.7 Backward shifting—
as is implied by certain models of wage determination—remains a
possibility, however.
In our analysis, we assume that there is no backward shifting
onto wage changes; however, we do allow for some backward shifting
of certain taxes onto the value of oil-bearing land. This has the effect
of shifting the burden of any increase in taxes on the oil industry, in
part, onto provincial revenues.
The model is designed to analyze the financial flow equilibrium ex-
pected to prevail before any substantial adjustment of real capital
stocks has occurred. This design implies that net before-tax operating
incomes of corporations are unaffected by the reforms, provided that
aggregate demand is unchanged. If net operating income is unchanged,
then the following two conditions describe the disposition of changes
in the components of operating income in each of the producing sectors:
RE+DPAE+CCAE—DFAE+ TE+ TER+DDE—O,(8)
and
RN+DPAN+CCAN—DFAN+ TN± TNR+DDN=O. (9)
Finally, as discussed earlier, equilibrium requires that the rate of
increase in the money supply be willingly accepted, so that one has the
condition
7Carter Report, Vol. II, pp. 144—146.526 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
M—W=0. (10)
These eleven equations 0—10, all interpreted in terms of differ-
entials, constitute the set of equilibrium conditions of our model.8 Any
predictions about the effects of the proposed tax reforms must, to be
consistent, satisfy all the conditions. If the initial impacts of the pro-
posed reforms are such that these conditions are not all satisfied, then
interest rates, equity yields, and the level of aggregate income would
be forced to adjust.
This subsequent adjustment creates one important difficulty that
must be solved: any income adjustment that might be stimulated by the
reforms would confound simple aggregate-demand effects with the tax-
structure effects that we are trying to isolate. Therefore we specify that
the process of adjustment, whatever it is, leaves the level of demand un-
changed. Moreover, we specify that the adjustment be such that the
new rates of interest and equity yields, whatever they are, are sustain-
able without further change. Finally, we examine only adjustments that
are consistent with equilibrium in the balance of payments. The upshot
of these restrictions is that we insist that all the above equilibrium con-
ditions be sustained, with government fiscal policy and money supply
so determined as to permit aggregate demand to be maintained un-
changed while preserving balance-of-payments equilibrium.
With this understood, we may proceed to complete and simplify
the system. We first add behavioral relations describing the independent
determination of all flow variables entering the system. We set M =0,
and drop equation
Summing equations 1—9 yields the balance-of-payments constraint,
equation (0); we therefore drop that equation from our explicit system.
Moreover, the way in which budget constraints enter the determina-
tion of the flows in equations 5—9 requires that one component of each
'The usualqualifications—thatwe must suppose a linearized system to yield an ade-
quate approximationtothe adjustment of the model following a substantial shock, and
V thatthe model began initially in (or sufficiently close to) flow equilibrium—of course
apply.
9 analyticalsimplification could be dispensed with, in studying a growing econ-
omy, by supposing both income and money supply to grow at constant relative rates;
for present purposes there is little to be gained by this analytical sophistication.1
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bedetermined residually. Hence we drop the behavioral relations for
BE, BN, CB, DDE, and DDN.
N Thesystem thus reduces to nine explicit conditions. Three are
Y equilibrium conditions referring to asset markets, and there are three
e asset-yield variables to serve as equilibrating variables. Government
expenditure is determined so as to maintain aggregate demand con-
stant; loosely, G may be viewed as determined by equation (4). Ac-
d counting identities and budget constraints (along with our assumption
that real stocks are not altered under the new tax system) are inherent
Lt in equations 5—9; these, therefore, may be thought of as determining
e BE, BN, GB, DDE, and DDN as residuals. The remaining equations
are behavioral relations, the specification of which is described in the
next section.
SPECIFICATION OF BEHAVIORAL RELATIONS
THIS section outlines the equations explaining the dependent variables
in our model, dealing first with the various components of the balance
of payments, and then with the equations for saving, investment, and
other financial flows in the economy.
In each equation, allowance is made for the shock or perturbation
introduced by the tax reforms, together with feedback effects from any
adjustments in interest rates, relative prices of equities in the extractive
and nonextractive sectors, government expenditure, and other endoge-
nous income or expenditure variables. The impact effects, which re-
flect the direct effect of proposed tax reforms on the dependent var-
iable in each equation, naturally differ between the two tax-reform
proposals and, therefore, are discussed separately below. Here we con-
sider the form of the various behavioral relations.
A. PORTFOLIO-CAPITAL FLOWS
The situations we examine obviously involve changes in the rel-
ative attractiveness of Canadian equities to Canadians and in the rel-528 • INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
ativeattractiveness of some of these securities to nonresidents. It is
necessary, therefore, to separate trade in Canadian equities from trade
in Canadian bonds.
In addition, since the indirect effects of the reforms may affect in-
terest rates in Canada, the relative attractiveness of Canadian bonds
vis-à-vis foreign securities is likely to change. Therefore it is necessary
also to distinguish net trade in foreign securities (mainly foreign equi-
ties) from net trade in Canadian bonds and stocks.
We assume that the direction and magnitude of international flows
of portfolio capita! are determined solely on the basis of the relative
after-tax yields to nonresident and resident investors. The effects of
the tax reforms are therefore felt simply through the changes in relative
yields for the three types of security brought about by the changes in
the tax structure, assuming that interest rates and before-tax equity
yields are given.
The indirect effects of the tax reforms are likely to be very im-
portant for these flows, however. Domestic interest rates and equity
prices will, in fact, change, thereby affecting further the relative yields
on these securities. The over-all sensitivity of total net flows of long-
term portfolio capital has been estimated within the context of three
complete quarterly econometric models of the Canadian economy, and
one complete annual While the three quarterly equations yield
comparable (and substantial) sensitivities to interest-rate differentials,
4
theinterest-rate sensitivity suggested by the annual model is much
lower.
We have therefore carried out two sets of runs —oneusing an over-
all yield sensitivity based on the equation of the Rhomberg quarterly
and one using the lower coefficient of the TRACE annual
'°R.R. Rhomberg, "A Model of the Canadian Economy under Fixed and Fluctuating
Exchange Rates." Journal of Political Economy (February, 1964), PP. 1—3 I; L. H. Of-
ficer, An Econometric Model of Canada Under the Fluctuating Exchange Rate. Cam-
bridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968; J. F. Helliwell, L. H. Officer, H. D.
Shapiro, and I. A. Stewart, The Structure of RDXI, Bank of Canada, Staff Research
Study No. 3, 1969; N. K. Choudry, Y. Kotowitz, J. A. Sawyer, and J. W. L. Winder,
TRACE, 1969: An Annual Econometric Model of the Canadian Economy. Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1971.
As the yield sensitivity in the Rhomberg model refers only to portfolio flows from
the United States to Canada, it was adjusted to be representative of all portfolio capital
flows to Canada.1•
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• model.'2 Becauseof problems withthe existing equation of the annual
model, and because the three quarterly models yield roughly consistent
results, we choose to emphasize the results obtained through the use
of the yield sensitivity based on the Rhomberg model. Better estimates
may perhaps be obtained from a complete analysis of the recently pub-
v lishedflow-of-funds accounts.13
Unfortunately, none of these models examines these capital flows
classified into the three types that concern us. A search of the avail-
able empirical literature in Canada and the United States did not turn
up separate estimates of the yield sensitivities of these three types of
f capital flow. Indeed, the main thrust of the conclusions in the literature
seems to be that capital flows generally are determined by factors other
than relative after-tax yields.
•/ As a result, we decided to construct estimates of the yield sensi-
tivity for each of the subcomponents of the total inflow of portfolio
capital from the above over-all yield sensitivities on the basis of the
following assumptions:
1. The relative yield sensitivity (yield response/existing holdings)
of American purchases of Canadian stocks is one-half of the
relative yield sensitivity of American purchases of Canadian
bonds. The sensitivity of our results to this strategic assumption
will be examined later.
2. The relative yield sensitivity of purchases of Canadian stocks
by other nonresidents and of Canadian purchases of foreign
securities is the same as that of American purchases of Cana-
dian stock.
3. The relative yield sensitivity of purchases of Canadian bonds
by other nonresidents is the same as that of American purchases
of Canadian bonds.
These three assumptions permit us to construct estimates of the
average yield response of each of the three types of inflow of portfolio
12 The coefficient used is the sum of the coefficients for the long-term and short-term
interest-rate differentials.
A preliminary report on the financial flow accounts in Canada is now available (Do-
minion Bureau of Statistics, Financial Flow A ccounts / 962—67. Ottawa, Queen's Printer,
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capital. The details of the calculation procedures are described in a
• previous paper.14
In order to examine the effects of changes in the tax structure and
• of changes in the yield of equities relative to bonds, the following two
additional assumptions are necessary:
4. The response of each type of capital flow depends solely on the
differentials between its after-tax yield to the relevant investor
and the after-tax yield on alternative financial investments.
5. The aggregate response of Canadian investors to changes in the
tax structure may be approximated by the behavior of a "typ-
ical" investor holding "typical" Canadian and foreign secu-
rities.
The resulting yield and relative price sensitivities of foreign pur-
chases of bonds (FB), foreign purchases of stocks (FS), and Canadian
purchases of foreign securities (CE) based on these assumptions and
the alternative over-all yield sensitivities are presented in Table 2.
Using the Rhomberg equation, for example, we obtain a yield sensi-
tivity of +10.15 for foreign purchases of stocks, which implies a rel-
ative equity-price sensitivity of these purchases of Thisre-
sponse is then divided into the extractive and nonextractive industries
in proportion to the share of resident-controlled capital in each of these
sectors.
In addition to the substitution effects represented by the coefli-
cients for interest rates and relative prices, allowance must be made
for the effects of any change in the total volume of personal savings
induced by the reforms. We base our estimate of the proportion of the
change in personal saving that is channeled into the demand for foreign
equities upon the relative importance of Canadian purchases of foreign
securities to total personal saving.
A.R. Dobelland T.A. Wilson, "Overall Effects of the Proposed Tax Reforms:
Savings, Investment, and the Balance of Payments." Institute for the Quantitative Anal-
ysis of Social and Economic Policy, Working Paper #6806.
Using as a base an average corporate bond yield of 5.2 per cent, a percentage point
change in bond yields corresponds to an 18.45percent change in bond prices. Relative
price sensitivities are therefore obtained by dividing the yield sensitivities by 0.1845







CSEC(26) .118 0 —0.72
CSN C(27) 0 1.06 —6.52
FSEC(28) .065 0 —1.21
FSN C(29) 0 .485 —8.94
FB C(30) 0 0 —61.30
CFC(3l) —.047 —.345 7.24
B. TRACE
CSE C(26) .042 0 —0.26
CSN C(27) 0 .379 —2.34
FSE C(28) .023 0 —0.43
FSN C(29) 0 .174 —3.21
FB C(30) 0 0 —22.00
CFC(31) —.017 —.124 2.59
NOTE: Interest-rate sensitivities are expressed in billions of
dollars per Unit of yield. Relative-price sensitivities are expressed
in billions of dollars. This means, for example, that one percent-
age point rise (a rise of .01 Unit) Ifl yields would increase the
foreign demand for the equities of the nonextractive sector by
.089 billion dollars; such a rise in yields would be equivalent, in
effect, to a relative price increase of .185in q,, (or I 8'/2 per cent).
Multiplying .186 by the relative-price coefficient .485 yields the
same response of .089 billion dollars. For this particular capital
flow, we have assumed that the effect of a change in equity yields
is the same, whether or not it is accompanied by a change in in-
terest rates.
TABLE 2
Structural Coefficients: Interest-Rate and Relative- Price
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B. DIRECT INVESTMENT
The available empirical evidence suggests that foreign direct in-
vestment in Canada is not very sensitive to changes in yields on mar-
ketable securities. Rhomberg, for example, found some response of
direct investment to changes in the interest-rate differential, but this
response is much lower than that of portfolio flows.
We therefore allow for only modest feedback effects of changes in
interest rates upon these flows. We estimate that a one per cent in-
crease in the interest-rate differential would increase total foreign direct
investment by $80 million, a figure obtained by scaling Rhomberg's es-
timate 16bythe ratio of total foreign direct investment in Canada to
United States direct investment in Canada. As a first approximation,
we shall assume that the effect of relative changes in equity prices is
commensurate with the interest-rate effect, after adjusting for the rel-
ative importance of equity issues to total funds raised in Canada.
We also make allowance for a modest yield effect on Canadian
direct investment abroad, based on scaling Rhomberg's coefficient for
American direct investment in Canada by the relative importance of
the two capital flows. For simplicity we assume that all Canadian direct
investment is channeled through the nonextractive sector.
C. DIVIDEND OUTFLOWS
An increase in corporate taxes levied upon foreign-owned firms
• can be accommodated by either a reduction in dividend outflows or by
an increase in foreign direct investment,'7 with equivalent balance-of-
payments effects. Since some minor tax advantages accrue to foreign
• firms when they reduce dividend outflows rather than increase foreign
direct investment, we shall adopt the convention that this effect of the
tax reforms bears wholly upon dividend outflows. These effects may be
treated wholly as shock effects, and, therefore, are discussed in the
following section.
6Rhomberg, op. cit., p. 10.
As stated, we assume that before-tax profits are not affected by the tax reforms.f
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D. NETEXPORTS
• Net exports (excluding exports and imports of capital services)
will be affected by any loss of export markets that might follow the
tax reforms, and by any change in imports resulting from a change in
the composition of final demand. For reasons to be discussed below,
we assume that there will be no loss of export markets.
n An import equation is based on the input-output equation devel-
oped by J. A. Sawyer.'8 This equation relates imports to the compo-
nents of final demand as follows:
IMP =.I93CONS+ .2431E (excluding land purchases)
+ .2901N + .066G + .134EXP.
S However, as GNP is constant in the equilibrium solutions of the model,
and since exports are constant by assumption, we may solve the above
equation in terms of G, IE, and IN, by substituting for C from the GNP
identity, thus obtaining the following equation:
X=.158G—.1201N—.0621E.
E.THEDOMESTIC DEMAND FOR DOMESTIC SECURITIES
The supply of domestic securities is composed of net sales by for-
eigners (the inverse of the capital inflow), net new equity issues by
s Canadian corporations, and new issues of bonds by Canadian corpora-
v tionsand by Canadian governments.
The demand is simply the financial saving of the household sector
less net purchases of foreign securities by Canadians. A portion of this
saving flow may, of course, be channeled through financial interme-
diaries, such as life insurance companies and pension plans.
e The model requires specification of the effects of relative changes
in yields on equities, bonds, and foreign securities upon the composi-
8J A. Sawyer, "Some Effects on the Current Account of the Balance of International
Payments of Implementing Recommendations of the Royal Commission on Taxation."
Institute for the Quantitative Analysis of Social and Economic Policy, University of
Toronto, Working Paper #6805.534 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENTOF CAPITAL
tion of the flow of personal saving.'9 Unfortunately, there is as yet no
evidence on the yield sensitivity of the allocation of personal saving
between these assets in Canada. However, we have already constructed
an estimate of the sensitivity of Canadian purchases of foreign secu-
rities to changes in Canadian equity yields. It is reasonable to suppose
that the bulk of such changes in holdings represents a switch of do-
mestic equities for foreign securities, since most foreign securities held
are equities. We shall therefore assume that a rise in Canadian interest
rates induces such switching from foreign to Canadian equities (when
the price of equities relative to bonds is constant).
In addition, a fall in the price of equities relative to the price of
bonds will induce switching from domestic bonds, as well as from for-
eign equities to domestic equities. While bonds are not as close sub-
stitutes for domestic equities as are foreign equities, domestic holdings
of bonds are much larger than are domestic holdings of foreign secu-
rities. We therefore assume that the extent of switching from bonds to
Canadian stocks is twice as important as switching from foreign secu-
rities to Canadian stocks. Using the yield sensitivities estimated by
Rhomberg, this would imply that the total response of the domestic
demand for equities with respect to a one percentage point rise in stock
yields is $217.2 million. This implies a relative price sensitivity of
—1177.
Since the tax reforms would affect the attractiveness of Canadian
equities at prevailing levels of interest rates and stock prices, allow-
ance must be made for an impact effect. The impact effects are based
on estimates of the effect of the tax reforms upon after-tax rates of
return to resident noninstitutional investors, given the above yield sen-
sitivity.
In addition, one of the tax-reform proposals analyzed provides a
great inducement to hold equities for pension plans and for life insur-
ance companies that set up trusteed pension plans. The impact of the
original Carter proposals upon equity holdings of pension plans and life
insurance companies has been studied by Courchene and Robin-
19Weignore residential construction throughout the analysis, and assume that none
of the induced changes in personal saving leads to increases in owners' equity in owner-
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son,2°and estimated impact effects based on their work arepresented
below.
However, since the size of presentholdings of equities by such
financial intermediaries is not large, it would not be reasonable to
adjust downward the estimate of the increase in directacquisitions
of equities by households by that amount. For theanalysis of the origi-
nal Carter proposals, we thereforeadd the estimate of the increased
holdings of equities by pension plans to the estimated impacts for non-
institutional investors.
While the adjustments in the demands for assets following the
reforms will reflect mainly the repercussions of changesin after-tax
yields and resulting adjustments in relative prices, it would beunwise
to neglect the effect of changes in personalsaving on these demands.
To ignore these would be to assume that the whole of any changein
personal savings induced by the reforms is felt in the domesticdemand
for bonds, since the latter is determined residually from thepersonal
saving identity. We therefore assume that any increase inpersonal
saving is divided between purchases of domestic bonds, purchasesof
domestic equities, and purchases of foreign securities in proportion to
• the observed relative importance of these purchases.
F. PERSONAL SAVING
The estimates of the effects of tax reforms upon personal saving
are obtained by combining an equationdetermining discretionary per-
• sonal saving based on the work of Winder,2' with an estimated shock
effect on contractual savings for the original Carter reformprovided
in the study by Courchene and Robinson. The shock effects ofthe al-
ternative tax system upon the components of personal saving are pre-
sented below.
The equation determining personal saving is based on a simple
20T. J. Courchene and T. R. Robinson, "Contractual Savings With and Without
Carter." Institute for the Quantitative Analysis of Social and Economic Policy, Working
Paper #680 1.
21J•W. L. Winder, Personal Savings.' Institute for the Quantitative
Analysis of Social and Economic Policy, Working Paper #6802536 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
permanent-income model. Since we lock the economic system at a
given level of aggregate demand via compensatory change in govern-
ment expenditures or general tax levels, personal saving will be af-
fected by changes in personal taxes resulting directly and indirectly
from the reforms, as well as by changes in dividends and corporate tax
rebates that vary with the level of investment. The marginal propen-
sity to save out of changes in these tax payments is set at .10. Follow-
ing Winder, the marginal propensity to save out of dividend payments
is set at .30.
The only other variable allowed to affect personal saving is the
rate of interest. The coefficient for this variable is taken directly from
the study by Winder.
0. CORPORATE RETENTIONS
The estimated impact effects and the feedback equations for the
retentions of resident-owned firms are based on a study by one of the
authors.22 The impact effects, which take the integration or partial
integration of personal and corporate taxes into account along with the
proposed increases in taxes at the corporate level, are discussed more
fully in the next section.
Since investment is an endogenous variable in the model, allow-
ance must be made for a feedback effect upon gross retentions via
changes in capital consumption allowances. According to the estimates
presented by Wilson, a unit change in capital consumption allowances
(CCA) leads to an increase in gross retentions of .82, financed by a
reduction in corporate taxes of .50 and a decrease in dividends of .32.
Since investment in the extractive sector is assumed to be insensitive
to changes in interest rates or equity prices, such a feedback need only
be specified for the nonextractive sector.
However, in the impact effect for resident-owned firms in the ex-
tractive sector, allowance must be made for their estimated reduction
in investment. We make implicit allowance for this by specifying that
22 T. A. Wilson, "Implications of the Carter Corporate Reformsfor Corporate Sav-
ings Behaviour." Institute for the Quantitative Analysis of Social and Economic Policy,
Working Paper #6803.
LI
IMPACTOF TAXATION ON CAPITAL FLOWS: CANADA •537
the total reduction in the retentions of these firms equals the total in-
crease in their corporate taxes.
The effects of the reforms upon the gross retentions of foreign-
owned firms is simply the estimated reduction in dividends paid abroad,
described above, less the increase in corporate taxes paid by these
firms. For example, under the original Carter proposals, the dividend
outflow from nonresident-owned firms in the extractive industries will
fall by $19 million, but their corporate taxes are estimated to rise by
$142 million. Hence their retentions must fall by $123 million. For
nonresident firms in the nonextractive industries, on the other hand,
the increase in corporate taxes of $117 million is largely offset by a
reduction in the dividend outflow of $92 million. Gross retentions are
therefore estimated to fall by $25 million.
The equations determining retentions used in the analyses are ob-
tained by adding the relevant equations for resident and nonresident-
owned firms.
H. INVESTMENT
The investment relation for the nonextractive sector is based on
a study prepared by one of the authors for the Carter Commission.23
The equations estimated in that study imply an interest-elasticity of
investment of —0.67. Therefore, a negative interest-rate feedback ef-
fect is specified, based on this elasticity. It is assumed that there will
be no feedback via adjustments of equity prices, on the grounds that
any incentive or disincentive provided by the tax reforms would have
already been accounted for in the calculation of the impact effects de-
scribed in the next section.
The investment effects in the mineral extractive sector of the orig-
inal Carter proposals are based oa a study by G. D. Quinn.24 No allow-
ance is made for any feedback effects from either interest rates or
equity prices. Since the tax reforms for the mineral industry proposed
23T.A. Wilson, Capita!investment and theCost of Capita!: A Dynamic Analysis.
Study No. 30, Royal Commission on Taxation, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1967.
24G.D. Quinn, "Economic Consequences on the Primary Mineral Industries of the
Adoption of the Recommendations of the Royal Commission on Taxation." Institute
for the Quantitative Analysis of Social and Economic Policy, Working Paper #6804.538•INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
in the White Paper will have no effect on revenues within the period
of our analysis, we assume that they will also have no effect on invest-
ment in that sector.25
I. NEW EQUITY ISSUES
The integration or partial integration of the corporate and personal
income taxes could affect the volume of new issues by affecting the
relative price of equities. In the absence of empirical estimates of the
sensitivity of new issues to changes in yields, we simply assume that
the elasticity of these issues to changes in the relative price of equities
is unity for each of the two sectors.
J. GOVERNMENT REVENUES
We assume that ultimately any necessary compensatory variations
in discretionary fiscal policy will be effected by either changes in gov-
ernment expenditure (G). or changes in other taxes (TO); in neither
case do corporate taxes vary. However, induced changes in investment
in the nonextractive industries will have direct effects on government
revenues by changing capital consumption allowances (CCA). An in-
crease in CCA would imply an increase in corporate taxes, offset to
some extent by a reduction in personal tax rebates under integration.26
Assuming that the average allowable CCA rate for the first year is
121/2 per cent, this would imply a reduction inrevenues from corporate
taxes of .0625 per dollar change in investment in that sector.
More important than these feedback effects are the estimated im-
pact effects of any tax reform upon government revenues. These are
discussed in the following section, in which we turn from specifying
the behavioral relations (and thus the coefficient matrix) for our model
to representing the proposed tax reforms as a perturbation of that
system.
It should be remembered that we are focusing the analysis on a Keynesian-type
intermediate run, during which financial flows may adjust to new equilibrium levels, but
within which real capital stocks are unlikely to be significantly altered.
26Aswill be explained later, integration of the corporate and personal income taxes
permits stockholders to obtain a rebate for corporate income tax paid.1
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ALTERNATIVETAX SYSTEMS AND THEIR
REPRESENTATION IN THE MODEL
THE MACROECONOMIC flow modeldescribed in the previous section
can be used to estimate the over-alleffects of changes in the tax struc-
ture upon saving, investment, the componentsof the balance of pay-
ments, and other endogenous variablesin the model. As described
earlier, what is required in addition to the matrix of coefficients linking
the various variables is:
I. A vector of shock effects —measuringthe partial effects of tax
proposals on each endogenous variable, holding the other var-
iables constant; and
2. The specification of the compensatory adjustments infiscal and
monetary policy designed to maintain both agiven level of ag-
gregate demand and equilibrium in the balanceof payments.
Given these specifications, the model solutions provide estimates
of the equilibrium effects upon the endogenous variables ofchanges in
the tax structure; these effects take into account thespecified inter-
actions among all the variables of the model.
We shall use this model to assess the economic effects ofthe fol-
lowing three tax reform proposals: 4
1.That of the Carter Report on taxation27 (also referred to below
as "original Carter");
2. That put forward by the Minister of Finance in therecently
published White Paper on Taxation;28 and
3. A set of proposals based on the original Carter recommenda-
tions, but modified to be comparable with the White Paper
proposal (henceforth described as "modified Carter").
Before proceeding to the specification of the vectors of initial
shocks, a brief description of the relevant features of each of these tax
proposals in relation to the present Canadian tax structure is in order.
27See note I, above
E. J.Benson, op.cit.
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THE ORIGINAL CARTER PROPOSALS
The Carter Royal Commission recommended the most sweeping
tax-reform package since the original evolution of the income-tax sys-
tem. The revenue-raising features of this package most relevant for
our analysis are the following:
1. Special provisions in the existing tax law that favor the extrac-
tive sector (oil and mining) were to be abolished. These include
percentage depletion and a three-year tax holiday for new
mines.
2. Special provisions favoring life-insurance companies and fi-
nancial institutions were to be eliminated.
3. The low 21 per cent rate on the first $35,000 of corporate in-
come was to be eliminated—henceforth all corporate income
would be taxed at a fiat 50 per cent rate. The effects of this
provision on existing incorporated small businesses and on new
businesses would be offset, in part, by a special provision for
accelerated capital-cost allowances.
4. In contrast to the existing Canadian system, where capital
gains bear no tax, all capital gains were to be taxed henceforth
at full personal rates upon realization. Deemed realization
would occur upon the gift or bequest of an asset.
5.Giftsand bequests were to be treated as income to the recipient
and to be taxed at full marginal rates. Under the present law,
bequests are subject to an estate tax, and gifts are taxed .to the
donor. The rates of this tax are well below those of the personal
income tax.
Most of the other changes in the tax law recommended by the
Carter Commission involved the "spending" of much of the revenue
gained by the above set of reforms. These involved lower marginal
rates in the personal income tax, the treatment of the family as the basic Ic.
unitof taxation, and the establishment of a separate schedule of family
rates,29 liberalized averaging and employment-expense deductions, and
29Unlikethe American "income-splitting" provision, under Canadian law husbands
and wives are taxed as individuals. This means that families in the middle- arid upper-I
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lowerrevenues from federal sales taxes. For our analysis, however, the
most important revenue-losing reform recommended is the full integra-
tion of the corporate and personal income taxes. Under this proposal
corporate and personal income taxes were to be fully integrated for
residentstockholders of Canadian corporations. Allcorporate income
was to be reported as income by the shareholder, who would receive
full credit for the corporate tax paid. In essence, this provision would
mean that the corporate tax would be abolished for resident share-
holders of Canadian corporations.
The net revenue effects of the various Carter proposals in relation
to the system prevailing at the time of the Carter Report are shown in
Table 3. As is apparent, reasonably large increases in taxation at the
corporate level would be offset by reductions in personal-income and
sales taxes. On balance the system proposed would have increased
revenues by a modest amount.
During the interval between the publication of the Carter Report
and the publication of the White Paper, several tax changes were
made,3° the net effects of which were to raise sales and income taxes.
In the budget of the government changed the treatment of life-
insurance and financial institutions, largely following the recommenda-
tions of the Carter Report. Consequently a comparison of the original
Carter proposals with the present (1969) tax system would show that
the Carter proposals would reducerevenuessubstantially.
TI-IE WHITE PAPER PROPOSALS
The proposals made in the White Paper differ from the Carter
proposals in several ways. First, although modifications in the treat-
ment of oil and mining were provided for, the new proposals —replacing
percentage depletion and the three-year tax holiday for new mines by a
incomebrackets are taxed relatively more heavily than is the case in the United States.
For most families, the Carter Family Rates Schedule would be virtually equivalent to
American 'income-splitting."
The two most important changes were the imposition of the surtax on corporate and
personal incomes and the imposition of the "social development tax."
31 Budget Speech delivered by the Hin. Edgar J. Benson, Minister of Finance, House
of Commons, October 22, 1968.
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TABLE 3
Revenue Effects of Proposed Tax Reforms
(millions of dollars per year)
Original Modified White
Carter Carter Paper
(in relation (in relation (in relation
to 1966 to 1969 to 1969
Tax Change system)a system)
A.Corporate income tax
Oil & mining reforms
(extractive) +176c +2O4d 22e





ive) +306 +420 538




Integration —363 — —230
Gifts and bequests +210 — —
Otherpersonalre-
forms —38 — +300
Total personal income
tax —191 +70
C.Sales tax —125 no change no change
D.Total revenue +181 —336 +630
a Source:Tables 35—15 and 37—3 of the Carter Report (Vol. 6). Corporate
revenues are as estimated in Table 37—3; personal income-tax revenues are
adjusted downwards by $6 million to preserve consistency with total revenues
as estimated in Table 35—15. (All estimates relative to the tax system as at
1966.)
bSource: The White Paper, op. cit.,Tables15 and 16.
Takes into account the federal tax gain as a result of reduced write-offs
because investment declines, and the provincial revenue loss due to back-
ward shifting onto land values.
dCarterestimates from column I were multiplied by the ratio of profits in
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new "incentive depletion" scheme and more rapid depreciation of
mining equipment—were not to take effect for five years. Secondly,
for "widely held" Canadian corporations, the corporate and personal
income taxes were to be partly, rather than fully, integrated,32 and
• pension funds were not to benefit from this integration. Under this
• proposal, cash or stock dividends would be subject to a 50 per cent
gross-up, but only 50 per cent of the corporate tax paid on the income
would be credited.
One-half of the capital gains on the shares of widely held Canadian
companies would be subject to the capital-gains tax. In addition, there
would be a deemed realization of gains on such shares every five years.
Capital gains on all other assets would be subject to taxation at full
rates only upon actual realization. Upon bequest of assets at death,
capital gains would escape taxation until subsequently realized by the
recipient of the asset.
32 Income from "closely held" Canadian corporations was to be fully integrated. A
corporation is defined as widely held if its stocks are listed on any exchange, or traded
over the counter.
Total revenues raised by corporate reforms other than the dual rate have
been prorated between the extractive and nonextractive sectors on the basis
of the division of revenues for "other corporate reforms" shown in Table 37—3,
of the Carter Report, op. cit.
Estimates are taken from the White Paper, Table 16.
gCarterestimates from column I were multiplied by the ratio of corporate
profits in 1969 to corporate profits in 1964; estimated revenues yielded by the
current corporate surtax were then deducted.
1 Additional revenue loss due to life insurance companies and other in-
termediaries shifting the composition of their portfolios in favor of equities,
and thereby benefiting from integration, is taken into account.
'Net effect of including gifts and bequests in income and abolishing ex-
isting separate taxes.
Carter revenue estimates from Table 35—15 of the Carter Report, op.
cit., were projected to 1969 using an income elasticity estimated as follows:
the measured income elasticity of the 1967 system across the 1964—69 pe-
riod was adjusted upward by Bossons' estimate of the difference in the income
elasticities of the two systems (John Bossons, A General Income Tax Ana-
lyser, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1967, pp. 52—54). The large revenue loss in
relation to the 1969 system reflects the existence of the personal income-tax
surcharge and the social development tax, neither of which was in effect in
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While the top marginal rates in the personal income tax were to
be lowered to 51.2 per cent under the White Paper proposals, marginal
rates throughout most of the income distribution were to be raised. The
generous proposals of the Carter Report regarding averaging, employ-
ment-expense deductions, and so on, were made less generous, and
Carter's family-unit proposal was not recommended.33 As the White
Paper dealt only with income taxes, the sales-tax reductions proposed
by Carter need not be taken into account. The main revenue-losing
proposal in the White Paper was an increase in the exemptions for
adults from the present level of $1000 to $1400.
The estimated revenue effects as presented in the White Paper
are shown in Table 3. In contrast to the Carter proposals, the tax struc-
ture proposed by the White Paper would raise a more substantial
amount of revenue at the end of five years. Moreover, there is some
reason to believe that these revenue estimates may err on the conserva-
tive side.34
Because of the various tax changes enacted between the publica-
tions of the two reports, and because the White Paper does not deal
with sales taxes, we believe that it is necessary to modify the Carter
proposals for purposes of comparison with the White Paper, as well as
to update the estimated revenue effects to a more current year. These
modifications are as follows:
1. The sales-tax recommendations of the Carter Report are
ignored.
2. The recommended reforms on life-insurance and financial
institutions are ignored.
3. Credit for corporation income tax is not extended to pension
plans.
4. The revenue estimates are updated to the year 1969, to make
them directly comparable with those of the White Paper.
The Minister of Finance did state,, however, that it would be possible to consider
the family unit proposal as a further installment of reform subsequently (White Paper,
p. 15).
Accordingto press reports, the Ontario government has prepared estimates of the
revenue effects of the White Paper proposal that are double those of the federal govern-
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The revenue effects of the modified Carter scheme evaluated for
the year 1969 are also shown in Table 3. While this scheme would
raise larger revenues at the corporate level than would the White
Paper proposals, this increase is more than offset by the substantial
revenue loss occumng at the personal level. The result, in contrast to
the White Paper scheme, is that the modified Carter scheme would
reduce government revenues in relation to the current tax structure.
SPECIFICATION OF IMPACT VECTORS
The three tax schemes are directly represented in our model in
terms of three tax variables:
TE (corporate taxes paid by the mineral extractive sector);
TN (other corporate taxes —excludingtaxes on life insurance
companies);
TO (all other taxes).
However, the details of the tax structure are also taken into ac-
count in the specification of the shock effects in the equations deter-
mining investment, corporate saving, and demands for asset flows.
Before proceeding to the specification of shock effects upon corporate
retentions and investment, a brief description of the way in which
integration of the corporate and personal taxes could affect corporate
behavior is in order.
Integration or partial integration of the corporate and personal
income taxes can be viewed as consisting of two steps:
I. A reduction in the rate of tax upon cash dividend distributions,
and
2. A change in the effective rate of tax on corporation profits.
Algebraically the existing system and the two alternative systems
for large companies can be specified as follows:
1. Current system —





3. White Paper proposals (assuming retentions are declared as
stock dividends)
TC=.SOir+ m(l.50)(DC + RET) —.25ir+ m GW/2
or
TC =(.75m+ .25)ir + m GW/2,
where
TC =totaltax paid on corporate source income
=before-taxcorporate profits
m =marginalrate of tax on personal income
DC =cashdividends
RET =retentions
GW= "Goodwill Gains"36 (capital gains on shares in
excess of reported retentions).
It is reasonable to assume that firms will react to that portion of
the tax change that bears on cash dividends in the same way as they
have reacted to changes in the dividend credit under the existing sys-
tern,37 and that they would react to changes in the effective over-all
rate of tax in the same way as they reacted in the past to changes in
marginal corporate-tax rates. On the basis of these assumptions, we
estimate the shock effects of the reforms upon corporate saving by
Unlike the Carter Proposals, under the White Paper stockholders would not re-
ceive credit for corporate tax paid on retained earnings, unless they were declared as
stock dividends.
36Fora study of the relative importance of dividends, retentions, and goodwill gains
in the over-all rate of return on Canadian equities, see John Bossons' Razes of Return
on Canadian Common Stocks: Dividends, Retentions, and Goodwill Gains. Royal
Commission on Taxation, Study No. 27, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1967.
Dividends received from Canadian corporations are subject to a 20 per cent divi-
dend credit under the present system. The dividend credit was originally introduced in
1949 at a level of 10 per cent, and was doubled to the present level four years later.
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resident-ownedcorporations, using an empirically estimated cash- r
dividend function.38 The effect on investment in the nonextractive
sector is based on an aggregate-investment function,39 on the further
assumption that the elasticity of investment with respect to changes in
the after-corporate-tax rate of return is the same as its (negative)
interest elasticity.
The estimated negative shock effects of the Carter proposals on
investment in the extractive sector are based on a study of that sector
by G. D. Quinn.40 Since the revenue impact of the mineral industry
reforms proposed in the White Paper is estimated to be negligible for
the first five years,41 we shall assume that these reforms will also have
no effect on investment. (A subsequent computation allowing for a
significant reduction in investment in this sector revealed no drastically
different results.)
The equations referred to above indicate that, for the typical
stockholder in the 3 5—40percent marginal-rate bracket for personal
income tax, the Carter proposals would lower the marginal tax burden
on corporate-source income, whereas the White Paper proposals would
increase it. Hence, the impact effect of the White Paper on investment
is negative, whereas, outside the extractive sector, the Carter proposals
would have a positive effect.
The impact effect on the demand for assets is based on the various
yield sensitivities discussed above, together with estimates, developed
by John Bossons,42 of the impact effects of the alternative tax proposals
on after-tax rates of return to shareholders. While Bossons did not
consider the specific White Paper proposals, the White Paper proposals
may be approximated by a linear combination of two alternatives to
the Carter proposals that were explicitly studied by Bossons. As is
shown in Table 4, we estimate that, whereas the Carter proposals
would raise total after-tax yields to resident noninstitutional investors
An empirical examination of the effects of changes in the dividend credit is con-
tained in the study of corporate savings behavior by Wilson (T. A. Wilson, "Implica-
tions of the Carter Corporate Reforms for Corporate Savings Behaviour").
39T. A. Wilson, CapitalInvestmentand the Cost of Capital.
D. Quinn, op. cit.; cf. White Paper, Table 16, p. 96.
E.J. Benson, op. cit.
D. Bossons, "The Effect of the Carter Proposals and Alternative Proposals on













5—6 18.9 —3.1 +2.3 +0.5
8—10 17.1 —5.2 +1.6 —0.7
15—20 11.0 —10.4 —0.6 —3.9
35—50 —0.2 —21.1 —4.8 —10.2
200—300 —8.0 —29.8 —8.0 —15.2
Over-alL effect 17.5 —10.0 +1.0 —2.7
a Source:John Bossons, "The Effect of the Carter Proposals and of
Alternative Proposals on Stock Prices," Table 5, p. 140.
bSource:Ibid., Table 6, p. 143.
Assuming marginal personal rates unchanged, the White Paper proposal
may be derived by a weighted average of the two alternatives to Carter ex-
amined by Bossons; the cash dividend integration scheme has a weight of 2/3,
and the half-credit, half-gain scheme a weight of
by about 17 per cent, the White Paper proposals would depress after-
tax yields slightly.43
Because these reforms will affect corporate cash flow, investment,
and retentions, they must necessarily affect either the dividend outflow
to nonresidents or the direct-investment component of the capital
inflow. Since the balance-of-payments consequences do not depend
on the mechanism of transfer, we shall adopt the convention that the
43This is, of course, consistent with the estimated impact effects on investment. It
might, however, be inconsistent with the estimates of the revenue effects of partial
integration published in the White Paper itself. Since the White Paper estimates show
that integration would lose revenue, the two analyses would be consistent only if the
increase in the effective tax burden on investment at the margin is more than offset by
the elimination of dividend taxes and the reduction in the taxes to intramarginal stock-
holders, such as persons in lower iicome groups, and by the reduction intaxesto owners
of closely held corporations (who, under the White Paper proposals, would benefit
from the full integration of corporate and personal income taxes).
T
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TABLE4
Effects of Alternative Tax Proposals on After-Tax Yields
(Nonextractive Sector)
(per cent)IMPACT OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL FLOWS: CANADA •549
TABLE 5
Effectsof Alternative Tax Proposals on Dividend Outflows
(millionsof dollars per year)
a Includeschanges in provincial land revenues.
b Excludes land costs.
corporate responses to tax changes affect the dividend outflows for the
two producing sectors. Table 5presentsthe relevant calculations of the
effects on these flows,and demonstrates one effect of these tax changes,
particularly those of the Carter proposals, which has appeared para-
doxical to some observers—that the increase in the tax burden on the
corporate-source income of nonresidents would have positive balance-
of-payments effects via these financial flows. Given our assumptions,
what is happening is that the reduction in corporate cash flow for non-
resident firms is greater than the reduction in investment by these
firms,44 so that capital requirements are increased. If the nonresident
Sincethe marginal corporate income tax rate is not changed for firms outside the
extractive sector in any of the reforms, we assume that there will be no change in real
domestic investment by any such firms. The estimated reduction in investment by for-










Tax revenues a +121 +143 +15
Investmentb 94 94
Capital requirements +27 +49 +15
Increased use of Canadian
sources of funds +7 +13 +4
Reduction in dividend outflow +20 +36 +11
Nonextractive (nonresident)
Tax revenues +117 +138 +197
Investment 0 0 0
Capital requirements +117 +138 +197
Increased use of Canadian
sources of funds +20 ±22 ±34
Reduction in dividend outflow +97 +114 +163
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firms continue to finance their over-all capital requirements in the same
proportions as between domestic and foreign sources, these firms will
have to reduce their dividend outflow (or increase their direct invest-
ment into Canada), thereby giving rise to the positive balance-of-
payments effects.
Under the original Carter proposals, a great incentive to invest in
Canadian equities would be provided to pension funds. It is likely that
this incentive would stimulate a large increase in both contractual sav-
ings and in the demand for equities. We have taken estimates of both
these impact effects from a detailed study by Courchene and Robin-
son45 on the likely reaction of life-insurance companies and pension
• plans to the reforms proposed by the Carter Commission. The esti-
mated total shock effect of the Carter proposals upon personal saving
• is the sum of the shock effect on contractual saving and the shock effect
on discretionary saving. Estimates of the latter, found in the study by
Winder, take the former into account and are consistent with them.
The shock effects of the reforms upon foreign direct investment in
Canada are zero, since, as noted above, any effects on the flow of funds
from foreign firms to their Canadian subsidiaries are represented as
opposite adjustments in dividend outflows. However, it is likely that
there will.be a small negative shock effect on Canadian direct invest-
ment abroad under the Carter proposals, since full integration of the
personal and corporate income taxes would increase the attractive-
ness of domestic investments relative to foreign. Since partial inte-
• gration would not provide nearly as great an incentive to invest in
• domestic real assets, we specify a zero impact effect in the analysis of
the White Paper proposals.46
The alternative vectors of impact effects of the three tax schemes
are presented here in Table 6. The detailed calculations underlying
these estimates are discussed elsewhere.47 As is apparent, the vector
of impact effects differs sharply between Carter (or modified Carter) F'
andthe White Paper, indicating that these are indeed quite different
tax systems when viewed in this way.
nCourchene and Robinson, op. cii.
proposed treatment of foreign.source income of Canadian corporations is dis.
cussed in sections 4.40 and 6.16 of the White Paper.
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COMPENSATORY POLICY ADJUSTMENTS s'
d
Thebehavior model developed earlier is designed explicitly for
the purpose of examining the equilibrium effects of changes in the tax v
structure at a given level of national income, and the conventional r
multiplier-accelerator trappings of models of national-income deter- e
mination are therefore absent. As noted, in order to evaluate properly c
the structural effects of specific proposals for tax reform, it is necessary e
to build in a compensatory mechanism designed to stabilize aggregate
demand. Otherwise the results will reflect a mixture of the structural
effects and changes in national income, making the results most diffi-
cult to interpret, particularly when, as is the case with the White Paper
and Carter proposals, the recommended tax structures have opposite
effects on government revenue, a
In a highly open economy, such as Canada's, a system of fixed- o
exchange rates means that only those solutions compatible with bal- fc
ance-of-payments equilibrium represent viable choices open to the c4
policymaker.48 Therefore we further constrain the analysis by setting
the rate of change of official holdings of foreign exchange equal to zero,
which means that we treat the balance-of-payments equilibrium as a
constraint on the solutions. sl
These two restrictions—balance-of-payments equilibrium and
maintenance of aggregate demand at a fixed level —are,of course, not a
automatically satisfied in the system of equations. In general, in the
absence of compensatory macroeconomic policies, a specific set of tax i1
changes would affect aggregate demand and upset the equilibrium in
the balance of payments —evenif the tax changes had no net impact
effect on government revenues.
Balance-of-payments equilibrium, at a given level of aggregate
demand, may be ensured by allowing for compensatory variations in
general fiscal and monetary policies. In all solutions of the model,
the function of interest rates and equity prices is to clear the flows of
demands and supplies in the relevant capital markets at yields consis-
tent with balance-of-payments equilibrium. This means that monetary
policy must act so as to accommodate the changes in yields necessary,
48Othersolutions are necessarily transitory and are therefore inconsistent with the
flow equilibrium model that we have constructed.
4
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sincethe resulting interest rates would not automatically equate the
• demand for money with the existing stock of money.
r In the case of general fiscal policy, two simple alternatives exist:
variations in government expenditure and variations in general tax
revenues. We use both mechanisms in alternative solutions, since the
effects of the changes in the tax structure are not independent of the
compensatory fiscal mechanism specified. The use of government
expenditure, (G), as a policy instrument presents no conceptual
-e difficulties and may indeed represent the most likely policy action that
would be adopted, particularly in the case of a set of revenue-raising
reforms put forward by the government itself.49 However, the use of
this variable has the drawback that it implies a contraction or expansion
e in the size of government expenditure in response to the tax changes,
a response that would not be neutral with respect to either interest rates
or the balance of trade. Hence, in a comparison of alternative tax re-
- formsthat have widely differing effects on government revenues, the
comparative effects of using this particular compensatory mechanism
could be distorted.
At first glance it is tempting to allow for a general scaling upward
• or downward of all three tax variables. This is inappropriate, however,
since certain features of the recommended tax changes may be re-
garded as more fundamental than others. In particular, both Carter
and the White Paper recommended a particular rate of tax on corpo-
e rate profits, in part because of prevailing levels of corporate tax rates
in the United States. Consequently, in the "general tax compensated"
n
Indeed the Canadian business community has expressed the fear that the White
Paper proposals are being put forward partly as a means of raising government expendi-
ture levels in the future. l-Iowevei-, other possible explanations should be mentioned:
C I. because of the uncertainties of estimating the revenue effects of such far-reaching
ii tax changes, the government may hesitate to commit itself to revenue-losing
reforms or reductions in rates at this time;
2. since sales-tax reforms are the next item on the tax-reform agenda, the govern-
rnent may intend to spend the revenues gained in the income-tax reforms in sales-
tax reductions;
3. the government may feel, in the light of the current economic situation, that a
Y tighteningof fiscal policy is desirable;
4. in order to ensure no reduction of revenue in the early transitional years of re-
form, the government may adopt rates that would ultimately yield revenue in-
creases, intending to introduce successive future tax reductions as the transition554 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
solutions, we allow for only TO—general revenues from personal-
income and sales taxes—to vary. Since sales taxes are presumably
more neutral with respect to saving and investment decisions than are
income taxes, purists may choose to regard compensatory changes in fl
TO as resulting from changes in sales taxes alone. Needless to add, a ft
comparison of the solutions using the alternative compensatory mech- ii
anism provides some insight into the structural effects of tax-corn- n
pensated changes in government expenditure as well. p
Having specified all the elements to be used in our analysis, we ii
turn, in the next section, to a discussion of the alternative model solu- ti






MODEL solutions were obtained for three variations on each of the c
three tax proposals. Using the yield elasticities estimated by Rhom- tI
berg, we carried out the computations first with compensating fiscal b
policyaccomplishedthroughexpenditurevariations,andthen
'
throughchanges in taxes. The third variation involved the use of ii
the TRACE yield sensitivities within a government-expenditure-corn- ci
pensated solution. C
The runs analyzing the original Carter reforms are not directly
comparable with the others, since the former refer to incomes as of
1964 rather than 1969. 'We therefore concentrate our discussion on a f
comparison between the White Paper and the modified Carter pro- 0
posals, both of which take as their basis the income and revenue struc- a
ture of the 1969 tax system. First, we shall examine the effects on the
balance of payments. Second, we shall consider the implications of
these for the equity and bond market. Third, we assess the effects on
the sources and uses of gross saving—saving, investment, government
revenues, government expenditure, and net exports. Finally, we dis- di
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BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTSEFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORMS
The consequences of the alternative tax reforms for the compo-
nents of the balance of payments are summarized in Table 7. All three
a tax proposals have net positive impact effects on the balance of pay-
ments, indicating that in the absence of compensatory policy adjust-
ments and changes in the rates of interest and equity prices, these
proposals would cause an increase in the accumulation of official hold-
ings of gold and foreign exchange. This positive impact effect can be
traced, in all three cases, to the increase of the tax burden on corpora-
tions owned by nonresidents, which causes a reduction in their dividend
outflows.
The equilibrium solutions reveal that all the final changes in the
• components of the balance of payments are modest; however, the pat-
tern of effects differs between the modified Carter and the White Paper
• proposals in interesting ways. The modified Carter proposals would,
according to our estimates, cause a net worsening of the current ac-
e count on merchandise trade, whereas the White Paper would improve
- themerchandise balance. This reflects the fact, discussed further
below, that the modified Carter proposal would increase investment,
whereas the White Paper would reduce it. Since investment has a high
f import content, this explains the worsening in the balance of mer-
- chandisetrade that occurs under the modified Carter proposals as
compared with the improvement projected under the White Paper
y proposals.
If Of perhaps greater interest—given Canadian concern about
a foreign ownership and control—are the effects on the various flows
of equity and direct investment. The modified Carter proposals
apparently would cause a modest (but not trivial) reduction in foreign
e purchases of Canadian equity (including direct investment). In the
tax-compensated solutions, the over-all gross swinginthe portfolio-
equity and direct-investment flows amounts to $120 million per year
Thegross swing isthe reduction in Canadian purchases of foreign equity (including
direct investment abroad) pit'sthereduction in foreign purchases of Canadian equity
(including direct investment in Canada), on the grounds that in an expanding economy
both of these changes would tend to increase Canadian ownership of Canadian equity.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• IMPACT OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL FLOWS: CANADA •557
witha net effect on the over-all balance of payments of— $12 million per
year. Under the White Paper proposals, the incentive to "buy back"
Canadian industry appears to be much less; the gross swing is only $13
million per year, with a slightly larger net negative balance-of-payments
effect (—$35 million per year).
In the tax-compensated runs, the proposed reforms cause a re-
duction in foreign purchases of bonds because of the downward pres-
sure on interest rates. Since the decrease in interest rates is larger
under the White Paper, so is the reduction in foreign purchases of
bonds.The expenditure-compensated runs give rise to a larger reduc-
tion in bond purchases in the White Paper solutions, and a tiny increase
•
in bond purchases under the modified Carter proposals, reflecting the
wide divergence in government expenditure necessary to compensate
• for the divergence in revenue effects.
• It is also noteworthy, in comparing the government-expenditure-
compensated runs with the tax-compensated trials, that the net balance
on merchandise trade is quite sensitive to the compensatory mechanism
•
specified.This reflects the very low import content of government cx-
penditure. Aside from these two items, the equilibrium response of the
components of the balance of payments is not much affected by the
change in the compensatory mechanism.
The balance-of-payments results thus indicate that, provided ap-
propriate compensatory macroeconomic policies are adopted, the ul-
2 timate effect of these two tax reforms upon the components of the bal-
ance of payments is quite modest. The estimated changes lie, generally,
• within observed year-to-year changes in these flows.
V
CAPITALMARKETS EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORMS
V
TURNINGto the capital markets, we see a different picture of the var-
• ious adjustments in capital flows and of the shifts in yields and relative
prices required to achieve equilibrium. Table 8 tabulates the equilib-
• rium effects of the various reform proposals on the bond and equity
markets. Under the modified Carter proposals, positive shock effects
would occur in the market for nonextractive equities, and negative
shock effects in the market for extractive equities.558 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
TABLE 8
Equilibrium Effects in Bond and Equity Markets of Selected Tax Reforms
(millions of dollars per
G Compensated T Compensated
Modified White ModifiedWhite
Market Carter Paper Carter Paper
A. Bond Market
New issues:
Extractive 56 18 62 15
Nonextractive 263 68 318 47
Government —396 —360 —665 —261
Demands:
Domestic —79 —86 —189 —46
Foreign 3 —189 —96 —153
Change in interest rate
(basis points) 0 —31 —16 —25
B. Equity Markets
Extractive:
New issues —7 —5 —9 —4
Domestic demand 10 —5 8 —5
Foreign demand —38 0 —17 0
Change in relative price
(per cent) —8.0 —6.3 —11.2 —5.2
Nonextractive:
New issues 85 —29 83 —28
Domestic demand 123 —21 122 —21
Foreign demand —38 —8 —39 —7
Change in relative price


















NOTE: All solutions based on Rhomberg yield sensitivities.
This table shows fairly large changes in flows occurring in the
bond market under the modified Carter proposals, mainly as a result
of the reduction in government borrowing requirements. This reduction
is offset by reductions in demand by both domestic and foreign lenders,
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andby increases in new corporate issues in response to the rise in in-
vestment and the fall in the rate of interest.
Under the White Paper proposals, these effects, while in the same
= direction,are muted. This softening of response reflects the reduction
in private investment that directly reduces the new issues of corporate
— bonds,but that indirectly creates a need for a more expansionary fiscal
policy. This, in turn, causes a smaller reduction in government borrow-
ing requirements.
— Interestinglyenough, the adjustments to both sets of reforms ap-
parently require only very modest reductions in interest rates— 16
5
basispoints under the modified Carter proposals, and 25basispoints
7 underthe White Paper proposals.
In the equity markets the modified Carter proposals would cause
a modest rise in the price of nonextractive equities relative to bonds,
6 while the White Paper would cause a slight reduction. This result
mainly reflects the stimulus to investment in nonextractive equities
under the modified Carter proposals, and the slight initial reduction in
after-tax rates of return to investors that would occur under the White
Paper. Given the slight reduction in interest rates that would occur,
however, the absolute price of nonextractive equities would, virtually,
be unchanged under the White Paper proposals.
o Equityprices in the extractive sector would experience a more
substantial reduction of 11 per cent under the modified Carter pro-
2 posals, reflecting the much more stringent tax changes applied to that
• sector. Under the White Paper proposals, there is not much difference
• between the two corporate sectors.
7 Summary sources-and-uses-of-funds statements for the four key
runs involving the White Paper and modified Carter proposals are pre-
I sented in Table 9.
— Inthe tax-compensated solutions, both the White Paper and mod-
ified Carter proposals would cause a reduction in private saving and
an increase in the government surplus, as well as an increase in net
investment abroad. However, the modified Carter proposals would
e give rise to a much more substantial increase in the government sur-
•t plus. This difference reflects the divergent effects of the two proposals
on total domestic investment: Whereas the modified Carter proposals
would give rise to an increase in investment of $299 million, the White
- •. - • - —-560 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL









































Domestic investment 253 —97 299 —114
Current account balance
(net investment abroad) —6 229 107 188
a Sourcesand uses do not exactly balance because of rounding.
Paper proposals would reduce investment by $1 14 million. Although a
net swing in investment of $400 million is not large, it is also not
trivial (it would amount to about five per cent of total plant and equip-
ment expenditures for this past year). Hence we could draw the con-
clusion that there is a nontrivial difference between the two proposals
with respect to the objective of economic growth.5' For the modified
Carter proposals, the use of expenditure changes rather than tax changes
in the compensatory mechanism leads to a reduction in the government
surplus, which is largely offset by effects on private saving in the cur-
rent-account balance. Under the White Paper, expenditure compensa-
51Ofcourse a complete assessment of the total impact of these proposals on rates of
economic growth must include an analysis of the resource allocation effects and the im-
pact of altered effective marginal tax rates on the supply of labor. On both grounds,












Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds: Equilibrium Effects of Selected
Tax Reforms
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lionleads to an increase in the surplus, which is ultimately offset by
• reductions in private saving and an increase in the current-account
balance.
SENSITIVITY OF RESULTS
— Beforeturning to our conclusions, it is worth pausing to consider
te the sensitivity of our results to variations in some of our basic assump-
'er tions. The model presented in this paper is designed to be an explicit
— general-equilibriumflow model, and many of its parameters are based
on empirical estimates. However, many of these estimates have large
.8 standard errors, and others are derived on the basis of assumptions for
which little evidence can be adduced in support. However, trials em-
bodying' elasticities based on the low interest-rate sensitivities from the
annual econometric model TRACE show roughly the same qualitative
results as those that use the Rhomberg elasticities. The same is true
of two further sets of runs (not shown) in which the ratio of the yield
sensitivity of bond flows to that of equity flows is allowed to vary from
1:1 to 1:4.
8 Furthermore, in an earlier version of this study dealing only with
— theoriginal Carter proposals, we also carried out an analysis of the sen-
sitivity of results to variations in a single element or a single column
of the coefficient matrix. For coefficients within a wide interval around
i a the estimated values we adopt here, our general conclusions appeared
ot to hold. Thus these sensitivity experiments appear to confirm the gen-
eral robustness of the over-all system when allowance is made for
equilibrating adjustments in asset markets, as well as for the direct im-





Our purpose in carrying out this analysis has been to study not
only the relations between tax changes and capital flows per se (al-
though we find that an increasingly fascinating subject). We have also
been motivated by a desire to know whether the requirement to main-
tain balance-of-payments equilibrium in a highly open economy seri-
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oftax reform. Since all our experiments involve the acceptance of a Ei
systemof fixed exchange rates, they can perhaps be regarded as pro- D
vidinga stringent test of the assumption—frequently made in Canada,
bothin general and with reference to the two formal tax proposals ex-
amined here —thatthe great degree of openness in our economy means
that we cannot freely choose a tax structure radically different from
that of our major trading partner.52
Our model does not permit us to address the question of the short-
run adjustments that may follow upon fundamental changes in the tax
structure. It is conceivable—if one believes in the stock-adjustment
models now gaining increased currency on theoretical grounds—that TH
very large destabilizing flows of capital could occur during the period in
in which portfolios are being adjusted following a change in the tax dis
structure. Nevertheless, none of the empirical work we have seen sug- pat
gests any tendency for flows of saving and wealth accumulation to be- Ru
come as specialized as models having rapid portfolio adjustment would tra
require. Nor do we discount the effects of inertia and institutional ri- the
gidities in smoothing the process of stock adjustment likely to follow pei
a majJr tax-reform bill. thi
What our results do suggest is that, in any case, once any short-
run storm has been weathered, the equilibrium effects of tax changes
on capital flows and yields are modest enough to be readily accom- C2
modated through the use of normal macroeconomic policies for corn-
pensatory purposes. ma
We have examined three tax-reform proposals, all of which can be inc
described as more fundamental than any tax reform seriously put for- Av
ward in the United States in the 1960's. Any of the three structural pa
reforms apparently could have been implemented without devastating be
side effects on the balance of payments or on the flow of funds within an
the domestic economy. Therefore, we venture the conclusion that it
is likely that the internal political constraints within a federal state, Jo
and the political pressures exerted by special-interest groups, may well eq
set effective constraints on the choices of federal policymakers regard- m4t
ing the tax structure long before balance-of-payments considerations
need become important. in I
52 Thisphrase has recently been repeated ad nauseam in some circles despite the fact
that there are already major differences between the tax structures of Canada and the
United States. 455
L